


A Control Framework for Demand Response of Thermal Inertial Loads

Abhishek Halder

Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Texas A&M University
College Station, TX 77843

Joint work with X. Geng, G. Sharma, L. Xie, and P.R. Kumar

Demand Response: what, why, how




Traditional paradigm: demand is uncertain

Operational model: supply follows demand

Mechanism: operating reserve

Demand Response: what, why, how




New paradigm: both supply and demand are uncertain

Operational model: demand follows supply

Mechanism: demand response

Demand Response: what, why, how




New paradigm: both supply and demand are uncertain


Operational model: demand follows supply

Mechanism: demand response **of thermal inertial loads**

Dynamics of AC state $(s, \theta, \sigma) \in \mathbb{R}^2 \times \{0, 1\}$




Dynamics of AC state $(s, \theta, \sigma) \in \mathbb{R}^2 \times \{0, 1\}$



Newton's law of heating/cooling: $\dot{\theta} = -\alpha (\theta(t) - \theta_a(t)) - \beta P \sigma(t)$

$$\text{ON/OFF mode switching: } \sigma(t) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \theta(t) \geq U \\ 0 & \text{if } \theta(t) \leq L \\ \sigma(t^-) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Proposed architecture



Research scope

Objective: A theory of operation for the LSE

Challenges:

1. How to design the **target consumption as a function of price**?
2. How to control so as to preserve **privacy** of the loads' states?
3. How to respect loads' **contractual obligations** (e.g. comfort range width Δ)?

Problem types


Load type \ Price type	Day ahead	Real time
Single large commercial
Many homes

Let's focus on **many homes + day ahead price**

Two layer block diagram

First layer: planning optimal consumption

Second layer: setpoint control



First layer: planning optimal consumption

$$\text{minimize}_{\{u_1(t), \dots, u_N(t)\} \in \{0,1\}^N} \int_0^T P \overset{\substack{\text{price} \\ \text{forecast}}}{\pi(t)} (u_1(t) + u_2(t) + \dots + u_N(t)) dt$$

subject to

$$(1) \quad \dot{\theta}_i = -\alpha (\theta_i(t) - \hat{\theta}_a(t)) - \beta P u_i(t) \quad \forall i = 1, \dots, N,$$

$$(2) \quad \int_0^T (u_1(t) + u_2(t) + \dots + u_N(t)) dt = \tau \doteq \frac{E}{P} (< T, \text{given})$$

$$(3) \quad L_0^{(i)} \leq \theta_i(t) \leq U_0^{(i)} \quad \forall i = 1, \dots, N.$$

Optimal consumption: $P_{\text{ref}}^*(t) = P \sum_{i=1}^N u_i^*(t)$

Second layer: setpoint control

optimal
reference

$$P_{\text{ref}}^*(t) = P \sum_{i=1}^N u_i^*(t), \rightsquigarrow$$

error

$$e(t) = P_{\text{ref}}^*(t) - P(t), \rightsquigarrow$$

measured

$$P(t)$$

PID velocity control

$$v(t) = k_p e(t) + k_i \int_0^t e(\zeta) d\zeta + k_d \frac{d}{dt} e(t), \rightsquigarrow \frac{ds_i}{dt} = \Delta_i \vee v(t),$$

gain


$$\Delta_i$$

broadcast


$$v(t)$$

$$\rightsquigarrow L_t^{(i)} = L_0^{(i)} \vee (s_i(t) - \Delta_i), \quad U_t^{(i)} = U_0^{(i)} \wedge (s_i(t) + \Delta_i).$$


Second layer: setpoint control



Control problems




control variable
 $\sigma(t)$



control variable
 $\frac{ds}{dt}$

Direct numerical solution


Given: distribution of the $N = 100$ loads'
initial conditions $(s_0, \theta_0, \sigma_0)$, and their contracts (Δ)




Direct numerical solution: $P_{\text{ref}}^*(t) = 50P$

Setpoint velocity control has good tracking performance

(k_p, k_i, k_d)




Fairness in setpoint velocity control




What does "fairness" mean?

all deadbands hit zero at the same time




identical states (room temperatures)
see identical controls (setpoint velocity)



no contractual constraints, fairness
is not an issue


Direct numerical solution: Houston data

Data for May 20, 2015, 4–6 PM



Direct numerical solution: Houston data

(k_p, k_i, k_d)



Analytical solution for planning problem

Analytical solution for planning problem

Intuition: what if price were **monotone** in time?


Assume: $N = 1$ home. Constraints (1) and (2) active.

Analytical solution for planning problem


Intuition: what if price were **monotone** in time?

Assume: $N = 1$ home. Constraints (1) and (2) active.

Price curve





Optimal control



Analytical solution for planning problem

Intuition: what if price were **monotone** in time?

Assume: $N = 1$ home. Constraints (1) and (2) active.






Analytical solution for planning problem

$N \geq 1$ homes. Constraints (1) and (2) active.

$$F_{\pi}(\tilde{\pi}) \triangleq \int_0^T \mathbf{1}_{\{\pi(t) \leq \tilde{\pi}\}} dt, \quad \pi^* \triangleq \inf\{\tilde{\pi} \in \mathbb{R}^+ : F_{\pi}(\tilde{\pi}) = \tau\},$$

$$S \triangleq \{s \in [0, T] : \pi(s) < \pi^*\}, \quad u^*(t) = \begin{cases} 1 & \forall t \in S, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$



Optimal actions are synchronized

Analytical solution for planning problem


Constraints (1), (2) and (3) active.

Case I: large $\Delta \Leftrightarrow \exists \Theta_0$ s.t. $\forall \theta_0 \in \Theta_0, \theta_{123}^*(t) = \theta_{12}^*(t)$

Analytical solution for planning problem

Constraints (1), (2) and (3) active.


Case I: large $\Delta \Leftrightarrow \exists \Theta_0$ s.t. $\forall \theta_0 \in \Theta_0, \theta_{123}^*(t) = \theta_{12}^*(t)$



Analytical solution for planning problem

Constraints (1), (2) and (3) active.

Case I: large $\Delta \Leftrightarrow \exists \Theta_0$ s.t. $\forall \theta_0 \in \Theta_0, \theta_{123}^*(t) = \theta_{12}^*(t)$



Understanding large Δ condition (lin traj)

Suppose $\dot{\theta} = \begin{cases} +\alpha \\ -\beta \end{cases}$. We have

$$2\Delta > \alpha(T - \tau) \vee \beta\tau$$

\Leftrightarrow

$$\exists \Theta_0 \doteq \left[\underbrace{L + [(\alpha + \beta)\tau - \alpha T]^+}_{\substack{= L \text{ for } \frac{\tau}{T} \in (0, \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \beta}] \\ > L \text{ for } \frac{\tau}{T} \in (\frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \beta}, 1]}} , \underbrace{U - \alpha(T - \tau)}_{\substack{L \leq \\ < U}} \right]$$

If $\theta_0 \in \Theta_0$, then optimal policy = $\begin{cases} \text{OFF} & \forall t \in (0, T - \tau) \\ \text{ON} & \forall t \in [T - \tau, T] \end{cases}$

i.e., $\theta_{123}^*(t) = \theta_{12}^*(t)$

Understanding large Δ condition (exp traj)

Suppose $\dot{\theta} = -\alpha(\theta(t) - \theta_a) - \beta Pu$. We have

$$2\Delta > \left(L(e^{\alpha\tau} - 1) + \theta_a + \frac{\beta}{\alpha}P \right) \vee \left((\theta_a - U)(e^{\alpha(T-\tau)} - 1) \right)$$

\Leftrightarrow

$$\exists \Theta_0 \doteq \left[L \vee \left(\theta_a + e^{\alpha T} \left(L - 2\theta_a e^{-\alpha\tau} + \frac{\beta}{\alpha} P e^{-\alpha\tau} \right) \right), \underbrace{(U - \theta_a) e^{\alpha(T-\tau)} + \theta_a}_{\substack{L \leq < U}} \right]$$

If $\theta_0 \in \Theta_0$, then optimal policy = $\begin{cases} \text{OFF} & \forall t \in (0, T - \tau) \\ \text{ON} & \forall t \in [T - \tau, T] \end{cases}$


i.e., $\theta_{123}^*(t) = \theta_{12}^*(t)$

Analytical solution for planning problem


Constraints (1), (2) and (3) active.

Case II: $\theta_{123}^{*(i)}(t) = \Psi_{L_0^{(i)}, U_0^{(i)}} \left(\theta_{12}^{*(i)}(t) \right)$, where $\Psi_{L,U}(\cdot)$ is the **two-sided Skorokhod map** in $[L, U]$

Digression: Skorokhod map Ψ




Digression: Skorokhod map $\Psi_{0,\infty}$



$$z(t) = x(t) + \sup_{0 \leq s \leq t} [-x(s)]^+ \quad (\text{Skorokhod, 1961})$$

Digression: Two-sided Skorokhod map

 $\Psi_{L,U}$ 

$$z(t) = \Lambda_{L,U} \circ \Psi_{L,\infty}(x(t))$$

$$\Lambda_{L,U}(\phi(t)) = \phi(t) - \sup_{0 \leq s \leq t} \left([\phi(s) - U]^+ \wedge \inf_{s \leq r \leq t} (\phi(r) - L) \right)$$


$$\Psi_{L,\infty}(x(t)) = x(t) + \sup_{0 \leq s \leq t} [L - x(s)]^+$$

(Kruk, Lehoczky, Ramanan, Shreve, 2007)

Analytical solution for planning problem

Constraints (1), (2) and (3) active.

Case II: $\theta_{123}^{*(i)}(t) = \Psi_{L_0^{(i)}, U_0^{(i)}}(\theta_{12}^{*(i)}(t))$, where $\Psi_{L,U}(\cdot)$ is the **two-sided Skorokhod map** in $[L, U]$



Summary

- ▶ A simple framework for optimal demand response.
- ▶ Designs optimal target consumption using forecast.
- ▶ Tracks the designed target consumption in real-time.
- ▶ LSE does not need to know individual states \Rightarrow preserves privacy.


Summary

- ▶ A simple framework for optimal demand response.
- ▶ Designs optimal target consumption using forecast.
- ▶ Tracks the designed target consumption in real-time.
- ▶ LSE does not need to know individual states \Rightarrow preserves privacy.



Thank you

Performance

Planning problem



TCL control problem



A red-bordered box containing the limit of performance equation. A horizontal arrow from $w_{\text{eff}}(t)$ points to the equation:

$$\lambda_T \doteq \lim_{\epsilon \downarrow 0} \frac{1}{\epsilon} \int_0^T 1_{\{0 < w_{\text{eff}}(t) < \epsilon\}} dt$$

Below the equation is the text "Local time of effective width process".

Limit of performance

Real time market + large commercial load

$$\underset{u(\cdot) \in \mathbf{1}_{\mathcal{P}(\theta, \pi_{\text{RT}}, \theta_a)}}{\text{minimize}} \quad \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^T \left\{ \pi_{\text{RT}} P u + \gamma (\theta - \theta_d)^2 \right\} dt \right]$$

subject to

$$(1) \dot{\theta}(t) = -\alpha (\theta(t) - \theta_a(t)) - \beta P u(t),$$

[ODE for continuous state θ]

$$(2) \mathbf{m} \triangleq (\pi_{\text{RT}}, \theta_a) \sim Q = Q_{\pi_{\text{RT}}} \otimes Q_{\theta_a}.$$

[finite state continuous time Markov chain for \mathbf{m}]

State: $(\theta, \mathbf{m}) \in \mathbb{R} \times |\mathcal{M}|$, where $|\mathcal{M}| = n_{\pi_{\text{RT}}} n_{\theta_a}$

Find: optimal (indicator) feedback $u^*(t) = \mathbf{1}_{\mathcal{P}(\theta, \mathbf{m})} \in \{0, 1\}$

HJB for controlled Markov jump process

Value function: $V_i \triangleq V(\theta, \mathbf{m} = i), i = 1, 2, \dots, |\mathcal{M}|$

HJB:

$$0 = \inf_{u(\cdot) \in \mathbf{1}_{\mathcal{P}(\theta, \pi_{\text{RT}}, \theta_a)}} \left[\pi_{\text{RT}} P u + \gamma (\theta - \theta_d)^2 + \frac{\partial V_i}{\partial t} \right. \\ \left. + \frac{\partial V_i}{\partial \theta} \{ -\alpha (\theta - \theta_a) - \beta P u \} + \sum_{j=1}^{|\mathcal{M}|} q_{ij} (V_j - V_i) \right]$$

$\forall i = 1, 2, \dots, |\mathcal{M}|$

Involves optimization problem:

$$\inf_{u(\cdot)} \underbrace{\left[\pi_{\text{RT}} P u + \frac{\partial V_i}{\partial \theta} \{ -\alpha (\theta - \theta_a) - \beta P u \} \right]}_{\Gamma(u)}$$

\Rightarrow If $\Gamma(1) - \Gamma(0) = \pi_{\text{RT}} P - \beta P \frac{\partial V_i}{\partial \theta} < (>) 0$, then $u^* = 1(0)$

What can we tell about the value function

Optimality condition: If $\frac{\partial V_i}{\partial \theta} > (<) \frac{\pi_{RT}(t)}{\beta}$, then $u^*(t) = 1(0)$

Notice:

Optimality condition is invariant under convexification

$$u \in \{0, 1\} \mapsto u \in [0, 1]$$

Lemma: $V_{i_{[0,1]}}$ is convex in θ .

Ongoing: code for value iteration, Q-learning.

Value iteration

Bellman equation:

$$V_k(i) = \min_{u \in \{0,1\}} \left[c_k(x = i, u) + \sum_{j \in \mathcal{X}} p_{ij}(u) V_{k+1}(j) \right], \quad V_T = \text{zeros}(n, 1).$$

Suppose we make 100 discretizations for $\theta \in [18, 22]$, and 40 discretizations for price $\pi_{\text{RT}} \in [50, 100]$. Let's make ambient $\theta_a = 32$ deg Celcius (constant). Then state space is a 100×40 grid. In Bellman equation, $n = 100 \times 40 = 4000$, and the indices $i, j = 1, 2, \dots, n$. The time index k runs backwards. So $k + 1 \mapsto k$ means a negative 15 minutes time-step. Take actual final time $T = 2 * 3600$. $[p_{ij}]$ is a transition probability matrix of size $n \times n = 4000 \times 4000$, and is constructed as $P = P_\theta \otimes P_{\pi_{\text{RT}}}$, where P_θ is of size 100×100 , and $P_{\pi_{\text{RT}}}$ is of size 40×40 . The symbol \otimes denotes kronecker product (MATLAB kron).